Conceptualization, in this sense, is the trademark of the ontological turn just as, say, ‘explanation’ epitomizes positivist approaches and that of ‘interpretation’ typifies hermeneutic ones. Indeed, much of the theoretical traction of the ontological turn comes down to the alternative that it presents to this rather hackneyed choice in the social sciences, between explanation and interpretation. For anthropologists to imagine their task as that of explaining why people do what they do, they must first suppose that they understand what these people are doing. The ontological turn often involves showing that such ‘why’ questions (explanation) are founded on a misconception of ‘what’ (conceptualization). E.g. the question of why certain people might ‘believe’ in nations, say, or ghosts, may be raised precisely because questions as to what a nation or a ghost (and indeed what ‘belief’ and ‘doubt’) might be have not been properly explored. And similarly for hermeneutics: conceived as cultural translation, to imagine that one’s job as an anthropologist is to ‘interpret’ people’s discourse or actions one must assume that one is in principle equipped with concepts that may facilitate such a process. To this the ontological turn counterposes the possibility that the reason why the things people say or do might require interpretation at all may be that they go beyond what the anthropologist is able to understand from within his conceptual repertoire. [Holbraad 16]